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REVISITING YOUNGSTOWN: AGAINST THE VIEW THAT 
JACKSON’S CONCURRENCE RESOLVES THE RELATION 





Virtually all legal analysts believe that the tripartite framework from Justice 
Jackson’s Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer concurrence provides the 
correct framework for resolving contests between the U.S. Congress and the 
president when he acts pursuant to his commander-in-chief powers.  This Article 
identifies a core assumption of the tripartite framework that, up to now, has not 
been recognized and that consequently has not been adequately analyzed or 
justified.  While Jackson’s framework importantly recognizes that Congress’s 
regulatory powers may overlap with the president’s commander-in-chief powers, 
the framework assumes that, as regards this overlap, lawful congressional 
enactments categorically trump the commander-in-chief’s contrary desires.  
After explaining that this assumption of “categorical congressional supremacy” 
(CCS) is a mechanism for sorting out conflicts that arise when two 
governmental institutions share overlapping power, the Article identifies five 
additional “conflict-sorting” rules that are found in other contexts in American 
law where governmental institutions have overlapping powers.  With the 
understanding that Jackson’s concurrence in effect made a choice among several 
candidate conflict-sorting principles, the Article then explains why his opinion did 
not adequately justify the particular conflict-sorting principle it adopted. 
To be clear, the Article does not conclude that CCS is the wrong conflict-
sorting principle, but instead makes the negative argument that the case has not 
yet been made as to what sorting principle should resolve conflicts between 
Congress and the commander-in-chief.  The Article closes by identifying the type 
of analysis that has been relied on to select conflict-sorting principles in other 
contexts.  The Article suggests that the same institution-sensitive, context-
                                                                                                                            
 * Visiting Professor, Northwestern University School of Law; Professor and Freehling 
Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.  Many thanks to Adam 
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Alongside the furious contemporary debate concerning such matters as 
the constitutionality of President Bush’s secret domestic spying program and 
the special military tribunals in Guantanamo Bay, there is one matter about 
which virtually all have agreed: that the tripartite framework from Justice 
Jackson’s magisterial concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer1 provides the appropriate frame for resolving contests between the 
U.S. Congress (when it acts pursuant to its powers to make rules and 
regulations for the land and naval forces, for instance) and the president 
when he claims to be acting pursuant to his commander-in-chief powers.  
This Article identifies a core assumption of Jackson’s tripartite framework 
that, up to now, has not been recognized and that consequently has not 
been adequately analyzed or justified.  The Article then identifies the type 
of analysis that should be undertaken to determine whether the assumption 
should be accepted, modified, or rejected. 
                                                                                                                            
 1. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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The hidden assumption is the backbone of the concurrence’s second 
and third categories, and is central to the way in which Jackson’s tripartite 
framework sorts conflicts between Congress’s powers and the president’s 
commander-in-chief powers.  It is best seen by first briefly reviewing 
Youngstown’s facts and the concurrence’s three categories.  The case asked 
whether President Truman had the power to order the seizure of steel mills 
to ensure continued steel production during the Korean War, 
notwithstanding the absence of statutory authorization for him to do so.  In 
his concurrence, Jackson famously propounded a tripartite framework for 
analyzing the constitutionality of presidential actions.  Category one 
concerns circumstances “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or 
implied authorization of Congress,” in which case the president’s “authority 
is at its maximum . . . .”2  Category two refers to situations in which the 
“President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of 
authority” and the president “can only rely upon his own independent 
powers.”  This, according to Jackson, is a “zone of twilight in which he and 
Congress may have concurrent authority . . . .”3  Category three embraces 
situations “[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress,” which he can constitutionally do, 
according to Jackson, only if he can “rely . . . upon his own constitutional 
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”4  
Though this canonical language describing category three is admittedly 
opaque, Justice Jackson more clearly described category three later in his 
concurrence when he stated that Truman’s seizure of the steel mills 
can be supported only by any remainder of executive power after 
subtraction of such powers as Congress may have over the subject.  In 
short, we can sustain the President only by holding that seizure of 
such strike-bound industries is within his domain and beyond control by 
Congress.5 
Categories two and three are themselves the product of three 
assumptions, the third of which is this Article’s target.6  The first 
assumption is that the U.S. Constitution directly grants the president some 
                                                                                                                            
 2. Id. at 635. 
 3. Id. at 637. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 640 (emphasis added). 
 6. A work in progress focuses considerable attention to the first two assumptions.  See 
Mark D. Rosen, Congress and the Commander in Chief: The “Coordinacy” Theory (manuscript, on 
file with the UCLA Law Review).  The work in progress defends both assumptions, and, in so 
doing, defends the second against some contemporary critics. 
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powers to act that exist without any need for Congress to do anything and 
are thus antecedent to congressional action.  This is what Jackson meant by 
the president’s “independent powers.”  The second assumption is that some 
portion of these antecedent presidential powers overlaps with congressional 
powers.  This is what the concurrence’s reference to “concurrent authority” 
means.  The third constituting assumption—the crucial assumption to 
which this Article is directed—is that wherever congressional power 
overlaps with antecedent presidential powers, congressional action 
categorically trumps. 
The third assumption has escaped attention up to now because, unlike 
the first two assumptions, it is not explicitly stated in Jackson’s 
concurrence.  But this third assumption, what I call “categorical 
congressional supremacy” (CCS), pervades categories two and three.  To 
see it, observe that the concurrence recognizes the possibility of 
“concurrent” power between the president and Congress, but note that 
categories two and three permit the president to act pursuant to his 
antecedent constitutional powers only when Congress has not acted 
pursuant to its overlapping constitutional powers.  Category two allows the 
president to act when he has independent constitutional power to do so and 
Congress has not acted.  Category three allows the president to undertake 
act “X” pursuant to his independent constitutional power notwithstanding 
congressional action disallowing act “X,” but only if the congressional 
action exceeds Congress’s constitutional power.  This is what the 
concurrence’s reference to “within [the president’s] domain and beyond 
control by Congress” means.  
In other words, according to the tripartite framework, where the 
president has preexisting constitutional powers that overlap with Congress’s 
powers and Congress regulates pursuant to its constitutional powers, the 
president is categorically bound to follow what Congress lays down and can 
no longer act pursuant to what his preexisting powers would have otherwise 
authorized him to do.  It is in this sense that Jackson’s framework embraces 
the assumption of CCS: Congress is supreme in respect of all powers that 
are jointly shared by Congress and the president.  Thus, CCS functions as a 
rule under which certain congressional actions trump presidential actions. 
While the Constitution grants the president many independent 
powers,7 this Article focuses on the tripartite framework’s application to the 
                                                                                                                            
 7. For example, the U.S. Constitution grants power to the president to issue pardons, to 
require that principal officers of executive departments deliver opinions relating to the duties of 
their respective offices, and to appoint ambassadors.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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commander-in-chief powers.  To see how the framework’s CCS assumption 
plays out in relation to Congress and the president’s commander-in-chief 
powers, consider the controversy concerning the National Security 
Agency’s (NSA) secret electronic surveillance program, in which President 
Bush authorized the NSA to intercept electronic communications without 
first obtaining the judicial approval required by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA).  Fourteen academics and former government 
officials, from across a surprisingly broad swath of the political spectrum, 
wrote a letter to Congress propounding an argument that tracks the three 
assumptions identified above.  Consistent with the first assumption that the 
president has independent powers, the letter did “not dispute that, absent 
congressional action, the President might have inherent constitutional 
authority to collect ‘signals intelligence’ about the enemy” via domestic 
surveillance.  Consistent with the second assumption of overlapping 
governmental authority, the letter then argued that “Congress plainly ha[d] 
authority to regulate domestic wiretapping by federal agencies” by means of 
FISA.  Citing only to Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence, the letter then 
quickly concluded that the president accordingly “must follow that dictate”8 
because “[w]here Congress has . . . regulated, the President can act in 
contravention of statute only if his authority is exclusive . . . .”9  The third 
assumption of CCS could not have been clearer. 
This Article primarily makes the negative point that Jackson’s 
concurrence does not adequately justify its reliance upon the CCS 
assumption as a conflict-sorting rule.  The first step in discerning the 
concurring opinion’s deficiency in this respect is recognizing that there are 
alternatives.  This can be seen by looking elsewhere in American 
constitutional law.  Functionally, the CCS rule serves the role of sorting out 
conflicts where more than one governing entity has authority over a given 
matter.  Such circumstances of overlapping governmental authority 
regularly arise because American law frequently (if not typically) distributes 
governmental authority between or among multiple government entities.  
For example, even though the Constitution grants Congress the power to 
regulate interstate commerce, states also may regulate interstate commerce.  
Similarly, states have the power to regulate so as to enforce equal protection 
even as Congress has the power to do the same under section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Of course, overlapping jurisdiction between 
                                                                                                                            
 8. Beth Nolan et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 9, 
2006, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18650. 
 9. Id. 
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Congress and the states creates the possibility of conflict in the event that 
the two governmental entities enact laws that are inconsistent.  It so 
happens that the Constitution itself provides a trumping rule for conflicts 
that can arise as a result of overlapping federal and state regulatory 
jurisdiction: the Supremacy Clause declares that federal law is categorically 
supreme.10 
The Supremacy Clause’s provision of categorical federal supremacy is 
structurally akin to Jackson’s assumption that Congress is categorically 
supreme in relation to the president, in that both treat the actions of one 
governmental entity as categorically trumping the actions of another entity.  
Categorical trumping rules are not, however, the only method found in 
constitutional law to sort out conflicts among governmental bodies with 
overlapping authority.  Sometimes constitutional law does not provide any 
principle to decide between or among governmental bodies that have 
overlapping jurisdiction.  To illustrate, states have significant areas of 
overlapping regulatory jurisdiction, meaning that two or more states 
frequently can regulate a single person, transaction, or occurrence.11  
Contemporary constitutional doctrine does not provide a principle for 
determining which state has the power to regulate.12  Conflict instead is 
resolved by means of subconstitutional legal principles (the body of law 
known as “conflicts of law”), as well as political negotiation within 
Congress (leading to federal statutes) and among states (leading to 
compacts and model uniform laws). 
There are yet other possible conflict-sorting rules that this Article 
canvasses.13 The  understanding that there are several candidate principles 
for resolving conflicts between the president and Congress serves as a lens 
for discerning this Article’s main point: that Jackson’s concurrence did not 
adequately justify the principle it adopted.  Further, the recognition that 
the Constitution explicitly provides one constitutional trumping principle 
(the Supremacy Clause)14 brings into stark relief the fact that the 
Constitution itself does not provide a principle for sorting out conflicts 
between Congress and the president’s commander-in-chief powers.  These 
                                                                                                                            
 10. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 11. See Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 946–55 (2002). 
 12. This was not always the case.  See id. at 961–62. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. There may well be others.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, 
which mandates that one state give “full faith and credit” to the “public acts” of other states could 
be another.  In parts of the early twentieth century, it indeed was construed in this manner.  See 
infra Part II. 
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two understandings—that there are several possible conflict-sorting 
principles and that the Constitution itself does not identify which one 
applies to conflicts between Congress’s powers and the president’s 
commander-in-chief powers—together suggest the type of considerations 
that should guide the choice among the candidate sorting principles.15 
One might object that whether or not the CCS assumption has been 
adequately justified, the Article’s argument is beside the point because it is 
inconsistent with settled law.  After all, Justice Jackson’s Youngstown 
concurrence is hoary precedent, and footnote twenty-three of the recent 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld16 decision cited to the Youngstown concurrence and 
asserted that “[w]hether or not the President has independent power, absent 
congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not 
disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war 
powers, placed on his powers.”17 
The Article offers two rejoinders.  The first and main response is that 
an inadequately considered proposition should not be treated as settled law 
even if the Justice or Justices who authored the proposition intend it to be a 
settled answer.  Second, the Article shows that Jackson’s concurrence is 
best interpreted as not having definitively resolved the relationship 
between Congress’s powers and the president’s commander-in-chief 
powers.18  The Article argues that the widely held view that the 
concurrence provides the legal framework for resolving conflicts between 
Congress and the commander-in-chief is a misreading—or, at the least, an 
overly broad reading—of the opinion.  The Article shows that to the extent 
that Jackson’s concurrence analyzed the relation between Congress and the 
commander-in-chief, Jackson did not rely on the tripartite framework in the 
mechanical manner that today’s disputants do.  More than this, Jackson’s 
concurrence contains inconsistent musings concerning the degree to which 
Congress can regulate matters that fall within the president’s commander-
in-chief powers. 
For these reasons, Jackson’s concurrence, at most, contains dicta on 
the relationship between Congress’s powers and the president’s 
commander-in-chief powers, and is best read as not offering guidance on 
how conflicts between Congress and the commander-in-chief should be 
resolved.  Either way, it is a mistake to read Jackson’s opinion as having 
                                                                                                                            
 15. See infra Conclusion. 
 16. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
 17. Id. at 2774 n.23. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
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provided a firm, well-considered resolution to conflicts that may arise 
between Congress and the commander-in-chief. And it would be 
unfortunate to continue to view the concurrence as if it answered questions 
to which its analysis was not directed, for, as the Article later suggests, 
determining the parameters of the relationship between Congress and the 
commander-in-chief is best done by a form of comparative institutional 
analysis that, while not inconsistent with Jackson’s opinion, was not 
performed in his concurrence.19 
The new understanding of the limits of the Jackson concurrence 
propounded in this Article has implications for footnote twenty-three of 
Hamdan.  Although the Hamdan majority opinion relied upon Jackson’s 
concurrence, and in so doing endorsed the CCS assumption, it did so 
without critical thought, on the assumption that it was merely confirming 
what everyone already knew to be correct.  Indeed, as the Hamdan opinion 
noted, the U.S. government did not even challenge the tripartite 
framework’s applicability during the Hamdan litigation.20  For these reasons, 
Hamdan’s cursory affirmation of the Jackson concurrence should not 
foreclose the full analysis that ought to precede the CCS assumption’s 
formal adoption, modification, or rejection.21 
This Article’s argument unfolds in four parts.  Part I shows the 
pervasiveness of the CCS assumption across both the government and the 
scholarly community.  Part II shows that the CCS assumption is one of 
several possible conflict-sorting principles.  Recognizing this range of 
conflict-sorting principles, Part III initially explains why Jackson’s 
Youngstown concurrence did not adequately defend the application of CCS 
to resolve conflicts between Congress’s powers and the president’s 
commander-in-chief powers.  Part III then responds to the possible 
objection that the CCS assumption nonetheless is deeply embedded in our 
case law and is thus a settled legal principle.  The Article closes by 
suggesting the type of analysis that is properly utilized to choose which of 
                                                                                                                            
 19. See infra Conclusion. 
 20. See infra Conclusion. 
 21. Although footnote twenty-three’s perfunctory discussion may suggest that it was only 
dicta, this is not so.  After the majority opinion determined that the military commissions 
established in Guantanamo Bay did not comply with statutory requirements, the Court necessarily 
had to consider the issue that was addressed in footnote twenty-three of whether the president had 
the power to disregard the statute and establish the tribunals.  Though the majority opinion gave 
short shrift to the question, footnote twenty-three was logically necessary to the Court’s ultimate 
holding that President Bush was without authority to establish the military tribunals in question, 
and thus, it would not be correct to describe footnote twenty-three as mere dicta. 
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the possible conflict-sorting principles should apply to contests between 
Congress and the commander-in-chief. 
I. THE COMMON WISDOM 
The tripartite framework that appears in Justice Jackson’s Youngstown 
concurrence, and its implicit assumption of CCS, have become the widely 
accepted approach to analyzing the scope of the president’s power to 
undertake act “X” where Congress either has been silent or has legislated 
that act “X” not be done.22  Indeed, Jackson’s concurrence and its 
accompanying assumption of CCS have pervaded the contemporary debate 
concerning the constitutionality of the most controversial pieces of the 
Bush Administration’s self-proclaimed war on terrorism.  First, consider the 
controversy concerning the constitutionality of the NSA’s secret program 
to intercept international communications into and out of the United 
States of persons thought to be linked to Al Qaeda or related terrorist 
organizations.  FISA authorizes electronic surveillance upon specified 
showings23 and requires approval by a special court that FISA created.24  The 
NSA program did not comply with FISA’s requirements because, among 
other things, the NSA collected electronic surveillance without first 
obtaining (or, much less, even requesting) court approval.25 
                                                                                                                            
 22. The reliance upon the tripartite framework is not undermined by the Dames & Moore 
v. Regan decision, in which the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer concurrence’s tripartite framework, but observed that “it is doubtless the case that 
executive action in any particular instance falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but rather 
at some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit 
congressional prohibition.”  453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981).  The softening of the distinctions between 
the three categories does not affect the assumption that the U.S. Congress’s preferences trump 
when they both fall within Congress’s powers and conflict with the commander-in-chief’s 
contrary desires.  Indeed, as described in this Part, the categorical congressional supremacy (CCS) 
assumption has played a central role in contemporary debates concerning the constitutionality of 
several of the Bush Administration’s antiterrorism policies. 
 23. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803–1806 (2000).  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) requires that the attorney general approve any application to conduct “electronic 
surveillance” for the purpose of obtaining “foreign intelligence information.”  Id. §§ 1803–1804.  
The attorney general–approved application then has to be approved by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court.  Id. §§ 1803–1804.  Among other things, the application has to show 
probable cause that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power, or an agent of a foreign 
power, and has to contain a certification from a high executive official that what is sought is 
foreign intelligence information that cannot reasonably be acquired through ordinary 
investigative means.  Id. § 1804(a)(7). 
 24. See FISA, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1801–1811 (2000)). 
 25. The U.S. Department of Justice’s comprehensive defense of the National Security 
Agency (NSA) program pointedly did not claim that the program complied with FISA’s 
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Both the criticisms leveled against the NSA program and the Bush 
Administration’s defense of it are grounded in Jackson’s Youngstown 
concurrence in general, and the CCS assumption in particular.  As shown 
above, the fourteen professors and former government officials who wrote to 
Congress to respond to the Bush Administration’s defense of its domestic 
spying program argued that although the president may have had inherent 
powers to collect the information under his commander-in-chief powers, 
Congress had the power to enact the FISA and the president thereafter was 
categorically obligated to comply with Congress’s directive.26  This 
argument is premised on the CCS assumption, and the letter’s authors cited 
to Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence—and only to Jackson’s Youngstown 
concurrence—for support. 
Interestingly, the Bush Administration’s defense of the NSA program 
also relied on Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence.  In its memorandum 
defending the NSA program (DOJ memo), the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) cited to the Youngstown concurrence when it argued that the 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 
2002,27 “transform[ed] the struggle against al Qaeda and related terrorist 
organizations from what Justice Jackson called ‘a zone of twilight,’ in which 
the President and the Congress may have concurrent powers whose 
‘distribution is uncertain,’ into a situation in which the President’s 
authority is at its maximum,” thereby “plac[ing] the President’s authority at 
its zenith under Youngstown.”28  There also is strong, though indirect, 
evidence that the DOJ memo relied upon the concurrence’s assumption of 
CCS.  The strongest evidence of this is an inference from omission: The 
absence of any argument to the effect that the NSA program was justified 
because legislative requirements in FISA could not categorically trump the 
president’s independent judgment under his commander-in-chief powers 
vis-à-vis the collection of electronic intelligence.  Though inferences from 
silence are treacherous, drawing this inference here seems plausible on 
                                                                                                                            
provisions.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 23 (2006), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf (arguing that “FISA permits an 
exception to the ‘procedures’ of FISA . . . where authorized by another statute, even if the other 
authorizing statute does not specifically amend [FISA]”). 
 26. See Nolan et al., supra note 8. 
 27. Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002). 
 28. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 11; see also id. at 17 (“The President’s power 
in authorizing the NSA activities is at its zenith because he has acted ‘pursuant to an express or 
implied authorization of Congress.’” (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., 
concurring))). 
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account of both the concurrence’s prominent role in the DOJ’s analysis and 
the comprehensive, no-holds-barred quality of the rest of the DOJ memo. 
Further evidence of CCS’s presence is found in the DOJ memo’s 
explanation as to why FISA should not be construed to preclude the NSA 
program.  The memo argued that such an interpretation of FISA would 
raise “serious constitutional questions”29 because, inter alia, it would 
“impermissibly impede”30 the president’s exercise of his commander-in-chief 
duties.  This argument is plausible when one assumes CCS, but is quite 
weak without the CCS assumption.  With the CCS assumption, 
interpreting FISA so as to prohibit the NSA program could plausibly be 
said to “impede” the president because FISA would categorically bind the 
president and, accordingly, would categorically prohibit the NSA program.  
Without the CCS assumption, however, the DOJ’s argument is severely 
undercut, for it is difficult to understand how a statutory interpretation 
under which the statute aimed to wholly displace presidential authority 
where the statute could not do so (on account of the absence of CCS) 
would impermissibly impede the president;31 such a statutory provision 
might be futile, but it would not impermissibly impede him.  The DOJ’s 
argument is thus best understood as tacitly piggybacking on the assumption 
of CCS. 
The same pattern of argumentation reflecting the CCS assumption 
runs through the controversy concerning the Bush Administration’s 
military commissions in Guantanamo Bay that were the subject of the 
Hamdan lawsuit.  Paralleling the previously examined argument made by 
the fourteen academics and former governmental officials in the FISA 
controversy, footnote twenty-three of the Hamdan decision cites to 
Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence and declares that “[w]hether or not the 
President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to 
convene military commissions, he may not disregard limitations that 
Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his 
                                                                                                                            
 29. Id. at 28. 
 30. Id. at 29. 
 31. This observation sheds light on an unintended consequence of the CCS rule’s 
interaction with the interpretive canon of constitutional avoidance.  The CCS rule makes it more 
likely that statutes will be interpreted as having a universally narrow application.  By contrast, a 
noncategorical rule of congressional supremacy makes it possible to construe a statute as having 
generally broad application, but being subject to select presidential overrides when, in the 
president’s judgment, the particular circumstances lead him to conclude that his commander-in-
chief duties require that he not “take care” that the particular statute be enforced.  For an 
enlightening discussion of the appropriate use of the canon of constitutional avoidance in the 
executive branch, see Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006). 
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powers.”32  This is the CCS assumption, pure and simple: It recognizes 
possible “independent” presidential power to act in the absence of 
congressional action, but asserts that the president categorically “may not 
disregard limitations” on his powers that Congress enacts pursuant to the 
“proper exercise” of its own powers.33  CCS was advanced by the appellants 
in the Hamdan case and embraced by a majority of the Court.  The Hamdan 
opinion also tells us that, with regard to the above-mentioned embodiment 
of the CCS assumption, “[t]he Government does not argue otherwise.”34  In 
short, both the government and the critics of the Bush Administration’s 
military commissions held fast to the CCS assumption in Hamdan. 
Scholars from across the political spectrum have recognized the 
influence that Jackson’s concurrence has attained.  Curtis Bradley and Jack 
Goldsmith have observed that the framework has been “widely accepted.”35  
Neal Katyal and Laurence Tribe have said that the concurrence provides 
“the three now-canonical categories that guide modern analysis of 
separation of powers. . . .”36  In embracing the framework and the CCS rule 
that is embedded within it, however, scholars have not made serious efforts 
to justify the assumption of CCS.  First, consider Saikrishna Prakash, 
among this country’s most prolific and insightful scholars on the subject of 
                                                                                                                            
 32. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006). 
 33. Admittedly, there is an alternative reading of this language from Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
(and, indeed, of Jackson’s category three) that does not assume CCS.  The sentence could be read 
as meaning that congressional action trumps the president’s independent powers only when the 
congressional effort to trump the president amounts to a “proper exercise” of Congress’s powers.  
On this reading, the sentence from Hamdan does not provide an analytical tool for sorting out 
conflicts between the Congress and the president, but only tautologically recites that Congress 
trumps when it properly trumps, without providing any guidance as to when Congress trumps. 
Such an understanding, however, deprives footnote twenty-three and Jackson’s category three 
of all analytical power and renders them into wholly conclusory assertions.  This is not the way 
that modern scholars (such as the authors of the letter to Congress criticizing FISA), the Hamdan 
majority, or the government (in conceding this point in the Hamdan litigation, see infra note 34) 
have understood Jackson’s concurrence.  After all, if category three had been understood by these 
parties merely as making a conclusory statement, their recitations of category three would 
necessarily have been preceded by a discussion of why Congress’s effort to displace the president’s 
independent powers was “proper” under these circumstances.  Yet none of these parties sought to 
do this, but instead ended their analyses by concluding that Congress had the power to enact the 
legislation at issue.  The absence of any such justificatory effort is incontrovertible evidence that 
category three and footnote twenty-three have been understood as resting on the assumption that 
Congress trumps when, pursuant to its constitutional powers, it regulates on matters that also fall 
within the president’s commander-in-chief powers.  And this, once again, is the assumption of 
CCS that, this Article argues, has not been adequately justified. 
 34. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 n.23. 
 35. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2050 (2005). 
 36. Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military 
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1274 (2002). 
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the president’s foreign affairs powers.37  One of his recent pieces considered 
the relationship between Congress’s powers and the commander-in-chief 
powers.  The piece helpfully marked out four possibilities: (1) The two 
governmental entities’ powers are wholly nonoverlapping; (2) they are 
wholly coterminous; (3) there is partial overlap such that each has some 
areas of exclusive power; and (4) Congress has a subset of the president’s 
powers with the result that the president has exclusive power over matters 
in respect of which Congress’s powers do not reach.38  Prakash notes that 
possibilities two through four contemplate that Congress and the president 
have some overlapping powers and insightfully observes that where two 
governmental institutions’ powers overlap, “it naturally invites the question 
of whose rules will govern when there is a conflict.”  Prakash is careful to 
refrain from coming to any firm conclusions as to which of the four 
possibilities best characterizes the relationship between Congress’s and the 
commander-in-chief’s powers,39 yet he does not bring this concern of 
avoiding premature conclusions to the question of how conflicts between 
overlapping presidential and congressional power (under possibilities two 
through four) should be resolved.  Though he fleetingly considers the 
possibility that the president could trump, Prakash concludes with literally 
no justification whatsoever that Congress’s acts “always trump the 
President’s,”40 such that “the President has his way until Congress speaks to 
the contrary.”41  Prakash’s conflict principle, of course, is the CCS 
assumption. 
Other times, the CCS assumption is less explicit though still evidently 
present.  Michael Ramsey, another important scholar of the president’s 
foreign affairs powers, has embraced the position that Congress’s powers and 
the president’s commander-in-chief powers are overlapping to some 
                                                                                                                            
 37. See Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 
701 (2003); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001); Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL 
L. REV. 215 (2005) (book review). 
 38. See Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating the Commander in Chief: Some Theories, 81 IND. L.J. 
1319, 1320–22 (2006).  There of course is a fifth possibility: that the president has a subset of 
Congress’s powers. 
 39. See id. at 1323 (“We just cannot say which theory is right in the abstract.  Until we do 
some difficult historical research about the original meaning of these various powers, all we can do 
is make somewhat educated guesses.”). 
 40. Id. at 1321–22. 
 41. Id. at 1321. 
14 54 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1 (2007) 
 
54:6 Rosen Rosen Final 1.doc (7/5/2007 12:11 PM) 
degree.42  In an article on the subject, Ramsey explained the two sorts of 
power that the president enjoys under the president’s commander-in-chief 
powers: (1) the initiatory power “to act in the absence of legislation in 
certain foreign affairs matters”; and (2) “some limit on the enumerated 
powers Congress otherwise would have, at least in the limited sense of 
preventing Congress from making another person the commander.”43  The 
former is the power to act where Congress has not, and the latter is the 
presidential power to act notwithstanding congressional action on account 
of the congressional action having been illegitimate.  Missing is any 
suggestion that the commander-in-chief powers include the power to 
override actions undertaken by Congress pursuant to its constitutional 
powers.44  Ramsey’s list of presidential powers, in conjunction with the 
notable absence just mentioned, strongly suggest that Ramsey has adopted 
the CCS rule.  Language elsewhere in his scholarship supports this 
conclusion.45 
Given the Jackson concurrence’s “canonical” status,46 it is not 
surprising that most scholars who invoke the opinion give even less 
attention to the framework’s foundational assumptions than Prakash and 
Ramsey provide.  Even the most sophisticated analyses of presidential power 
typically invoke the concurrence’s CCS assumption as a truism and 
dedicate their first-rate analytics to arguing that a given presidential action 
is unconstitutional insofar as it is inconsistent with a statute, falls within 
                                                                                                                            
 42. See Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1243 (2005) 
(concluding that “the Commander-in-Chief Clause preserves a concurrent power in the President” 
with the Congress). 
 43. Id. 
 44. A similar pattern of argumentation arises when Michael Ramsey criticizes the 
argument that ‘“[r]arely, if ever . . . have the president’s advisors claimed an authority to ignore 
the law as written by Congress.’”  Id. at 1239 (quoting David Savage & Richard Schmitt, Lawyers 
Ascribed Broad Power to Bush on Torture, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 2004, at A16).  His sole response is 
that the president may ignore laws that were beyond Congress’s power to enact.  Once again, it is 
what is omitted that is significant: Ramsey pointedly does not suggest that the president may 
disregard laws that, though not beyond Congress’s authority and that accordingly are not 
unconstitutional, would under present circumstances be inconsistent with the president’s good 
faith understanding of what his commander-in-chief powers demand.  Stated differently, from 
what it leaves out, Ramsey’s response appears to assume that the president necessarily would be 
bound by laws that were enacted by Congress pursuant to its constitutional powers. 
 45. See id. at 1243.  He argues that his theory of presidential power “does not demand that 
any of the President’s foreign affairs powers be immune from interference by congressional 
regulation, so long as Congress is acting pursuant to an enumerated power.”  Ramsey’s theory 
“establishes the President’s ability to act in the absence of legislation in certain foreign affairs 
matters.  It does not say anything about the President’s right to be free from congressional 
interference.”  Id. 
 46. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 36, at 1274. 
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category three, and accordingly violates the concurrence’s rule that 
Congress categorically trumps.47 
II. POTENTIAL CONFLICT-SORTING RULES 
This Part explains that CCS is a type of “conflict-sorting” rule and 
shows that there are several different candidate rules that can sort out 
conflicts in circumstances in which more than one governmental 
institution has authority.  Armed with the understanding that there is a 
range of possible conflict-sorting rules, Part III then shows that Jackson’s 
concurrence does not sufficiently justify the particular conflict-sorting rule 
it adopts. 
A. What Is a Conflict-sorting Rule? 
CCS plays a conflict-sorting role.  Conflict-sorting rules are turned to 
when identical authority rests with two or more institutions, for it must be 
decided which institution’s decision is to be authoritative when multiple 
institutions with overlapping authority issue conflicting demands.  CCS 
operates by declaring one of the two institutions hierarchically superior 
such that its decision, when lawfully made, categorically trumps the 
decision of the other.  More concretely, CCS provides that (1) where the 
president’s commander-in-chief powers overlap with congressional powers, 
and (2) Congress has acted pursuant to its legitimate powers in relation to 
the commander-in-chief powers (for example, by enacting legislation 
pursuant to its power to regulate the land and naval forces), then (3) 
Congress’s decisions categorically trump any contrary desire that the 
commander-in-chief may have.  CCS is a type of conflict-sorting rule that 
usefully may be called a “single-institution supremacy” principle.  Our 
constitutional order has other conflict-sorting rules of this sort: The 
Supremacy Clause, for example, declares that federal law trumps state law 
in circumstances in which states and the federal government have 
overlapping regulatory authority. 
Once one recognizes the function that CCS plays, two things follow.  
First, as a purely theoretical matter, it is obvious that there are other 
plausible conflict-sorting rules.  Second, as an empirical matter, a careful 
look at our country’s actual constitutional practice discloses that 
                                                                                                                            
 47. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinksy, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive Power and the 
War on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2006); Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World 
Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2361–74 (2006). 
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alternatives to single-institution supremacy are found in other contexts of 
overlapping governmental authority. 
B. Four Types of Conflict-sorting Rules 
Conflict-sorting principles can usefully be divided into four main 
categories: (1) those that resolve conflict on the basis of institution; (2) 
those that resolve conflict on the basis of time; (3) those that eschew any 
single criterion for resolving conflict and instead rely on multifactor 
analyses; and (4) those that forsake the need for resolving conflict.  The 
first two categories, in turn, can be usefully subdivided, as explained below.  
Moreover, not all of these conflict-sorting principles are directed to the 
judiciary.  Some are directed to, or can also be implemented by, nonjudicial 
governmental actors.  Furthermore—and wholly independent of the 
preceding point—many of the conflict-sorting principles do not have the 
status of constitutional law, but instead are subconstitutional principles.48  
Finally, whether the conflict-sorting principle has the status of 
constitutional or subconstitutional law, virtually all conflict-sorting 
principles that are currently used have been selected on the basis of 
institution-specific policy considerations.  All the above points are crucial 
to recognizing why Jackson’s concurrence did not adequately justify the 
conflict-sorting principle it adopted. 
1. Institution-based Sorting Rules 
Turning our attention to the first category, there are two sorts of 
institution-based conflict resolution rules.  What I shall call a Type 1A 
sorting rule identifies one institution as hierarchically superior to the others 
such that its decisions categorically trump others if and when there is 
conflict.  CCS and the Supremacy Clause are examples of a Type 1A 
sorting rule. 
                                                                                                                            
 48. This point is wholly independent of the preceding point because nonjudicial actors can 
create, or help to develop, constitutional principles. For an extended discussion of this, see H. 
JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2002); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive 
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in 
by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of 
power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ 
vested in the President by [Section] 1 of [Article] II.”). 
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What I shall call a Type 1B sorting rule establishes a presumptive, but 
noncategorical, hierarchy among institutions.  This type of sorting rule is 
found in the context of the division of fact-finding authority as between 
judge and jury under the Seventh Amendment.  Consider the doctrine 
concerning motions for judgment as a matter of law following a trial under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), which are also sometimes called 
judgments notwithstanding the verdict.  Although the jury is the 
institution with the primary responsibility for fact-finding,49 federal judges 
have the power to ask whether the evidence was sufficient to support the 
jury’s verdict50 and, if the question is answered in the negative, to displace 
the jury’s verdict and put in place a verdict for a different party.51  The 
judge’s sufficiency inquiry almost invariably requires the court to make 
credibility determinations and to perform other fact-finding functions,52 
meaning that the two institutions (judge and jury) have some overlapping 
                                                                                                                            
 49. See, e.g., Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (stating 
that the “aim of the [seventh] amendment” is that “issues of law are to be resolved by the court 
and issues of fact are to be determined by the jury”). 
 50. Id. at 659. 
 51. See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 50(b). 
 52. While the precise standard for granting a Rule 50 motion varies across courts, a 
common formulation that has received scholarly praise is whether ‘“there can be but one 
conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable [persons] could have reached.’”  See 9A CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2524, at 262 & 
n.15 (alteration in original) (quoting Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1970)).  
Although courts dutifully recite that they are to decide Rule 50 motions without weighing the 
credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, see id., it would 
seem that a judge’s decision to grant a Rule 50(b) motion (and to thereby decide that a jury’s 
verdict is not one that reasonable persons could have reached) often will constitute the court’s 
credibility judgment and/or weighing of the evidence.  A particularly clear illustration of this is 
found in the pre-Rules case of Pa. R.R. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333 (1933), which concerned 
the propriety of a trial court’s order that a jury grant verdict for defendant.  Writing for the 
Second Circuit, Judge Learned Hand reversed the district court’s judgment, ruling that the case 
should have been allowed to proceed to the jury because there was sufficient evidence to support a 
verdict for the plaintiff.  The Supreme Court reversed, deciding that the testimony of plaintiff’s 
sole witness could not have supported a verdict for the plaintiff.  It is hard to escape the 
conclusion that the Supreme Court made credibility determinations and weighed the evidence in 
its decision to uphold the grant of directed verdict.  Plaintiff’s witness was an experienced train 
yard worker who saw a faster-moving 9-car train closely trailing a slower-moving 2-car train, heard 
a loud crash, and thereafter discovered the decedent’s body.  The Supreme Court ruled that this 
testimony would have been inadequate to sustain a plaintiff’s verdict because there was testimony 
from several other witnesses that there in fact had been no train crash.  The Court’s decision that 
there was no conflict in the parties’ testimony as to the facts because plaintiff’s witness did not say 
there was a collision, but only said he heard a “loud crash,” id. at 338, sounds suspiciously akin to 
factfinding.  Likewise, it is implausible to describe the Court’s conclusion that “[t]he fact that [the 
defendant railroad’s] witnesses were employees of the [railroad] . . . does not impair this 
conclusion,” id. at 343, as anything short of an assessment that the railroad’s witnesses were 
credible. 
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authority.  Potential conflict between the two institutions is navigated by a 
Type 1B rule under which the jury’s findings are presumptively 
determinative; the judge is not permitted to act as a “thirteenth juror” and 
substitute her judgment for that of the jury, but only is allowed to overturn 
the jury’s verdict in extreme situations.53 
Another example of a Type 1B conflict-sorting rule can be found in 
the writings of several respected academics who discuss yet another context 
of overlapping governmental authority.  So-called “departmentalists” argue 
that each branch of the federal government has the constitutional power, 
indeed the duty, to act in accordance with its own good faith constitutional 
interpretations.54  Under this view, the federal executive, legislative, and 
judicial departments have overlapping governmental authority in respect of 
interpreting the Constitution.55  Virtually all departmentalists are of the 
view, however, that the president is required to enforce court judgments 
even if he should believe the judgment to be unconstitutional.56  Yet, these 
scholars do not believe the president’s duty to be absolute.  For example, 
Steven Calabresi argues that “presidents are absolutely constitutionally 
bound to execute even those court judgments with which they 
disagree . . . [a]bsent a clear mistake.”57  The strong, yet noncategorical, 
presumption that court judgments are to be enforced by the executive 
branch is a Type 1B sorting rule.  Regardless of whether this argument is 
convincing in this context, the embrace by serious scholars of a Type 1B 
conflict-sorting rule constitutes additional evidence that such a sorting rule 
is, at the very least, conceptually plausible. 
                                                                                                                            
 53. See id. 
 54. See, e.g., Steven G. Calebresi, Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor Paulsen, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1421–22 (1999); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive 
Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1268–69 (1996); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 
(1994). 
 55. See Part II.B.4. 
 56. Lawson & Moore, supra note 54, at 1313–14; see also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, 
Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1033–34 
& nn.28–31 (2004). 
 57. See Calabresi, supra note 54, at 1433 n.54 (emphasis added).  Interestingly, Calebresi 
argues that there has been only one such clear mistake in our nation’s entire history, that of Chief 
Justice Taney in Ex Parte Merryman.  See id.  Similarly, Gary Lawson argues that the “President 
may legally refuse to enforce a court judgment, but only if the President concludes, in accordance 
with an appropriately demanding standard of proof, that the judgment was constitutionally 
erroneous” and adds that “where private rights are at stake, the President can engage in executive 
review of judgments only when such review results in nonenforcement of a judgment of liability.”  
Lawson & Moore, supra note 54, at 1325–26. 
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2. Time-based Sorting Rules 
Let us now turn to the second category of conflict-sorting principles: 
those that sort on the basis of time.  Two such time-based principles can be 
found in American law.  Type 2A principles provide that where two or 
more governmental institutions have overlapping authority, the institution 
that acts first will trump subsequently acting institutions—a “first-in-time” 
rule.  A Type 2B rule, by contrast, grants trumping power to the institution 
that acts last. 
Type 2A principles are the predominant tool for resolving conflicts 
between or among courts that have overlapping adjudicatory jurisdiction.  
To see this, it first is necessary to recognize that overlapping adjudicatory 
jurisdiction occurs at all levels of our judicial system.  Two or more federal 
courts frequently have jurisdiction to hear a given matter.  More than this, 
where a federal court has jurisdiction, it almost always is the case that at 
least one state court also has jurisdiction.  Finally, the courts of two or more 
states frequently also have adjudicatory power to hear a given controversy. 
In this arena of overlapping governmental authority, there are no 
constitutional, institution-based sorting principles of the Type 1 variety.  
For example, no constitutional principle provides that federal courts shall 
have sole jurisdiction in respect of matters that also fall within state court 
jurisdiction or, in matters where two or more state courts have overlapping 
jurisdiction, that jurisdiction shall lie (for example) in the state where the 
primary defendant dwells.  The bulk of the potential conflicts between or 
among courts instead are sorted out by means of Type 2 principles (most of 
which are nonconstitutional), in conjunction with a subconstitutional Type 
1 rule.  The Type 1 rule is the federal removal statute, which generally 
allows defendants to remove a lawsuit originally filed in state court to 
federal court if the federal court also has jurisdiction over the matter.58 
Though important, the removal statute does not on its own eliminate 
all potential conflicts.  Two hypotheticals reveal the conflicts that remain, 
as well as the Type 2 principles that are utilized to sort out the resulting 
conflicts.  First, consider a situation where Y sues Z in court A with regard 
to matter M.  Assume further that Z thereafter sues Y in court B in relation 
to the identical matter M, and that courts A and B both have jurisdiction 
over matter M. 
To begin our analysis, much of the time, parallel lawsuits in courts A 
and B can (and do) occur.  This is the product of several legal doctrines.  
                                                                                                                            
 58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000). 
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First, no constitutional principle precludes both courts from proceeding 
with their lawsuits.59 Second, if courts A and B are both state courts, court 
A may issue an antisuit injunction purporting to enjoin state court B from 
continuing with its proceedings, but state courts tend not to feel bound by 
sister states’ antisuit injunctions, and the U.S. Supreme Court has strongly 
suggested (and arguably has held) that this is perfectly constitutional under 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.60  Third, if court A is federal and court B 
is state, then the federal antisuit injunction statute contemplates only 
limited federal court powers to enjoin parallel state court proceedings.61  
This, along with the absence of state court power to enjoin federal court 
proceedings,62 means that parallel state and federal court proceedings can 
occur. 
If both courts A and B simultaneously adjudicate matter M, the 
possibility arises that the courts could issue inconsistent judgments.  Such 
potential conflicts are eliminated by means of time-based sorting rules.  The 
nonconstitutional principles of bar and merger, claim preclusion, and issue 
preclusion avoid conflict by providing trumping force to the first court that 
issues a final judgment.63  Hence, these doctrines are all examples of time-
based conflict-sorting rules.  These doctrines emphatically are not 
institution-based conflict-sorting rules, for what matters is not the identity 
of the institution (state or federal), but only which institution has acted 
first (which, in this context, means which institution was first in generating 
a final judgment). 
To see this, assume for present purposes that court A is the first to 
issue a final judgment.  If courts A and B both are state courts, then the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause obligates state court B to give the effect to court 
                                                                                                                            
 59. Though abstention doctrines rooted in equity may allow (or sometimes even require) 
that a federal court stay or dismiss its proceedings pending resolution of the other action, see, e.g., 
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), abstention’s only periodic availability underscores 
the point made above in the text that parallel suits are not generally precluded. 
 60. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 236 (1998) (“[A]ntisuit injunctions 
regarding litigation elsewhere, even if compatible with due process as a direction constraining 
parties to the decree, see Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890), in fact have not controlled 
the second court’s actions regarding litigation in that court.”); see also id. at n.9. 
 61. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000) (“A court of the United States may not grant an 
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, 
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”).  For an 
example of a case that simultaneously found express authorization of federal antisuit injunctions 
and shows the anti-injunction statute’s narrow scope, see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). 
 62. See Donovan v. Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964). 
 63. See generally Baker, 522 U.S. at 233 & n.5. 
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A’s judgment that state A would give to court A’s judgment.64  If court A is 
a state court and court B is a federal court, then a federal statute that is 
deemed to give force to the constitutional principles of full faith and credit 
requires that federal court B give the effect to court A’s judgment that state 
A would give to court A’s judgment.65 If both courts A and B are federal 
courts, then the federal common law rules of merger, claim preclusion, and 
issue preclusion require that court B give effect to court A’s judgment.66  If 
court A is a federal court and court B is a state court, then court B is 
required to give the effect to court A’s judgment that is required under the 
rules of merger, claim preclusion, and issue preclusion.67 
In short, regardless of whether the first court to reach final judgment is 
a state or federal court, the first final judgment trumps subsequent 
adjudications.  The doctrines of merger, claim preclusion, and issue 
preclusion are time-based conflict-sorting rules that, depending on the 
identify of the courts and the order of the judgments, resolve conflicts by 
either constitutional or subconstitutional doctrines. 
Let us now turn to a second hypothetical to understand the potential 
conflicts that remain notwithstanding the federal removal statute.  Whereas 
the first hypothetical contemplated simultaneous lawsuits, this second one 
considers sequential lawsuits.  Imagine lawsuit 1 in which Y sues Z in court 
A with regard to matter M and final judgment issues.  Thereafter, lawsuit 2 
is filed in court B and, for present purposes, assume that court B has 
jurisdiction.  There are many ways that the second lawsuit in court B 
potentially could generate a result that is inconsistent with the first lawsuit.  
For instance, Y may have successfully sued Z for breach of contract in 
lawsuit 1, while Z may have sued Y in lawsuit 2 on the theory that the 
contract at issue in lawsuit 1 was actually part of an antitrust conspiracy.  If 
Z succeeds in lawsuit 2, this would suggest that the final judgment in 
                                                                                                                            
 64. See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908) (holding that the judgment of a 
Missouri court is entitled to full faith and credit in Mississippi even if the Missouri judgment 
rested on a misapprehension of Mississippi law). 
 65. The federal statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).  In support of the notion that this 
statute advances the constitutional principle of full faith and credit, see Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 
106, 109 (1963) (“The constitutional command of full faith and credit, as implemented by 
Congress, requires that ‘judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every 
court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such 
State . . . from which they are taken.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1738)). 
 66. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (finding issue preclusion 
in a second federal action on account of a judgment issued in a prior federal lawsuit). 
 67. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (determining the 
claim preclusion effect that a state court must give to a judgment issued by a federal court sitting 
in diversity). 
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lawsuit 1 was erroneous.68  The doctrines of merger, claim preclusion, and 
issue preclusion examined above operate in sequential litigations as they do 
in simultaneous litigations and largely eliminate the problem of 
inconsistencies across institutions that have overlapping jurisdiction.  For 
example, claim preclusion would prevent Z from pressing an antitrust claim 
in lawsuit 2.69  Indeed, federal rules go so far as to permit the assertion of 
nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel (issue preclusion); that is, Z may be 
disallowed from relitigating the breach of contract in lawsuit 3 that is 
brought by X, a nonparty to the first lawsuit.70 
All the above-mentioned time-based sorting rules are of the Type 2A 
variety insofar as they give trumping authority to the institution that acts 
first.  As a matter of pure logic, an alternative time-based conflict-sorting 
rule could give precedence to the institution that has most recently acted—
a “last-in-time” rule that I have denominated a Type 2B rule.  Empirical 
inquiry confirms this theoretic possibility, for American law currently 
utilizes a Type 2B rule to solve one unusual conflict that can arise in the 
context of overlapping adjudicatory jurisdiction.  In the words of the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, “[w]hen in two actions inconsistent 
final judgments are rendered, it is the later, not the earlier, judgment that is 
accorded conclusive effect in a third action under the rules of res judicata.”71  
Though these sorts of cases do not arise frequently, they do in fact happen, 
and the Restatement’s last-in-time rule is based on several Supreme Court 
opinions that have addressed these very circumstances.72  Last-in-time rules 
are found elsewhere as well.  Conflicts between treaties and federal statutes 
are resolved on the basis of a last-in-time rule.73  Last-in-time rules also 
predominate in contexts of intra-institutional conflict: In conflicts between 
earlier and later legislatures, the later statute trumps the earlier statute, and 
                                                                                                                            
 68. See Martino v. McDonald’s Sys., Inc., 598 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 966 (1979). 
 69. See id. 
 70. See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. 322 (allowing plaintiff in a second suit, who was not a 
party in the first lawsuit, to collaterally estop the defendant from relitigating the finding in the 
first lawsuit that its proxy statement was materially misleading). 
 71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15 (1982). 
 72. See Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 
66 (1939); see also Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 408 (1952) (stating that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause required a Nevada court to give effect to a New York decree that invalidated a 
divorce decree that had been issued in Nevada).  These cases are ably discussed in Ruth B. 
Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting 
Judgments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 798, 802–11 (1969). 
 73. See Julian Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and 
Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319 (2005). 
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conflicts between the constitutional interpretations of earlier and more 
recent Supreme Courts likewise are resolved on the basis of a last-in-time 
rule.74 
Let us return to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments’s last-in-time 
rule.  The presence of one last-in-time sorting rule in the context of 
overlapping adjudicatory jurisdiction, which is dominated by first-in-time 
rules, spotlights a crucial question: On what basis is the choice among 
conflict-sorting rules to be made?  Where constitutional text does not 
provide a ready answer—and it does not in the context of overlapping 
adjudicatory jurisdiction—it is true as a purely descriptive matter that 
American law has chosen the sorting rule on the basis of functional and 
institution-specific considerations.  For example, the Type 2A rules of claim 
and issue preclusion were selected for the purpose of achieving the well-
known policy objectives of securing the finality of judgments, achieving 
judicial efficiency, ensuring consistency across judgments, and relieving 
parties of the burden of being subject to multiple lawsuits.75  The Type 2B 
last-in-time rule in the case of multiple inconsistent final verdicts likewise 
was selected by the Supreme Court on the basis of functional and 
institution-specific considerations: The second inconsistent judgment came 
about because parties to the second lawsuit neglected to press their claim or 
issue preclusion arguments or failed to pursue appeal of their rejected 
arguments to the highest possible appellate court, and the last-in-time rule 
refuses to reward such neglect.76 
To be clear, the point for present purposes is not that the Court has 
made good or bad decisions in choosing the conflict-sorting principles it 
has.  Rather, what is significant is that there is no single, a priori conflict-
sorting principle for circumstances in which multiple governmental 
institutions have overlapping power.  And the choice among the options 
has consistently been made on the basis of institution-specific policy 
considerations. 
                                                                                                                            
 74. To be sure, stare decisis complicates the effort to fully describe the way that conflicts as 
to constitutional interpretation between earlier and later supreme courts are sorted out insofar as 
stare decisis grants some presumptive weight to the earlier rulings.  The other examples provided 
above in text, however, are instances of pure Type 2B rules. 
 75. See generally Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326–27 (discussing policy behind res judicata 
and collateral estoppel). 
 76. See, e.g., Morris, 329 U.S. at 552 (1947); Ginsburg, supra note 72, at 811 (explaining 
that the Court’s “last-in-time” rule is driven by the “policy requiring a party in the second forum 
to pursue diligently his claim for recognition of the first judgment”). 
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3. Multifactor Sorting Rules 
Let us now turn to a third approach to resolving conflicts among 
governmental institutions having overlapping authority: the multifactor 
sorting rule, which I denominate the Type 3 rule.  This approach is found 
in American law in the context in which two or more states have 
overlapping regulatory jurisdiction.  As I have shown elsewhere, there is a 
significant number of persons and transactions with respect to which two or 
more states have the power to regulate.77  Early Supreme Court case law 
sought to determine under the rubric of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
which state’s law appropriately applied.78  The constitutional sorting rule 
the Court adopted in that line of cases was not institution-based or time-
based, but instead inquired whether one state had an overwhelming interest 
in having its law applied.79  Contemporary constitutional doctrine 
continues to acknowledge that states’ regulatory jurisdiction may overlap, 
but declines to lay down a constitutional sorting principle.  Instead, the 
current law is that “the full faith and credit clause does not require one state 
to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it, 
the conflicting statute of another state, even though that statute is of 
controlling force in the courts of the state of its enactment with respect to 
the same persons and events.”80 
While there is thus no constitutional sorting principle to determine 
which state’s law applies in circumstances in which multiple states have 
overlapping regulatory jurisdiction, subconstitutional principles and 
practices have emerged to address the issue of potential conflict.  The 
doctrinal response is the subconstitutional—indeed, the state law—
jurisprudence that is known as choice of law.  In contrast with the 
institution-based and time-based solutions, both of which look to a single 
criterion to sort out conflicts, choice-of-law doctrine is infamously 
multifactored.81  There also have been some legislative responses.  Congress 
enacted the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act and the 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980.  These statutes, enacted 
                                                                                                                            
 77. See Rosen, supra note 12, at 946–55; Mark D. Rosen, Hard or Soft Pluralism?—Positive, 
Normative, and Institutional Considerations of States’ Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
713, 718–26 (2007). 
 78. See, e.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 624–
25 (1947); Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 163 (1932). 
 79. See Wolfe, 331 U.S. at 624–25. 
 80. Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939). 
 81. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). 
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pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause,82 determine which of several 
possible states’ laws is to govern matters relating to child support and child 
custody matters.  Respected scholars also have argued that states themselves 
could enter into compacts to resolve conflicts disputes.83  An important 
example of state-driven political solutions to the selection of conflict-
sorting rules is the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdictional Act.84  These 
legislative solutions also are multifactored; each takes account of multiple 
considerations in determining which state’s court has jurisdiction and 
which state’s law is to apply.85 
Three important lessons arise from the sorting techniques that are 
found in the context of overlapping state regulatory jurisdiction.  First, both 
choice-of-law doctrine and the legislative solutions are examples of Type 3 
solutions insofar as both eschew single-factor sorting principles and embrace 
more holistic considerations of what they deem to be normatively relevant 
considerations.  So, for example, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws enumerates a laundry list of factors that are appropriate to take into 
account when deciding which state’s law is to apply.86  The legislative 
solutions embodied in the above-mentioned statutory schemes likewise take 
account of many factors, resulting in a complex rule structure that yields 
resolutions as to which state’s law applies that vary on the basis of 
sometimes apparently small fact changes.  In short, the sorting techniques 
in the field of overlapping state regulatory jurisdiction exemplify an 
approach to conflict sorting that is analytically distinct from Type 1 and 
Type 2 solutions. 
Second, the sorting techniques in the context of overlapping state 
regulatory jurisdiction make clear that courts are not the only governmental 
institutions capable of formulating and enforcing conflict-sorting principles.  
                                                                                                                            
 82. See Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional: 
Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors That Determine What the Constitution 
Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915, 965 & n.187 (2006). 
 83. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(1963). 
 84. See generally Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A 
Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (1969). 
 85. For example, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act provides that the child’s “home 
state” shall have presumptive adjudicatory jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738A(c), (g) (2000).  
The Act gives a complex set of criteria for determining “home state” and provides an alternative 
basis for determining which state has jurisdiction in the event a child is deemed to have no “home 
state.”  Id. § 1738A(c)(2). 
 86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). 
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The political solutions were created by legislatures—both Congress and the 
states—not courts.87 
The third lesson is a byproduct of the first two lessons: recognizing a 
third type of conflict-sorting principle and understanding that nonjudicial 
institutions may play a role in fashioning and enforcing conflict-sorting 
principles make it even more urgent to determine what criteria properly 
inform the selection of the conflict-sorting principle that should apply in a 
given context of overlapping governmental authority.  Because there is a 
range of options both as to what conflict-sorting principles should be 
adopted, and what governmental institution or institutions should be 
responsible for fashioning and implementing the principle, whatever choice 
is made must be carefully justified and defended. 
4. No-sorting Rules 
There is one other possible response to overlapping governmental 
power.  The law could refuse to choose among the two or more institutions 
with overlapping powers, and instead allow both (or all) the institutions to 
simultaneously regulate, even if one institution creates a duty that is not 
consistent with the others.  Such a “no-sorting rule,” which I denote as a 
Type 4 rule, rejects the premise of all the aforementioned sorting rules that 
where two or more institutions have overlapping jurisdiction and impose 
inconsistent requirements, only one institution must be found to have had 
power. 
There are not many no-sorting rules in contemporary constitutional 
practice, but they do exist.  Such rules can be seen in the context of states’ 
overlapping criminal regulatory jurisdictions.  It is well established that two 
or more states may have overlapping criminal jurisdiction, meaning that 
two or more states may have regulatory jurisdiction to determine whether a 
given transaction or occurrence is permissible or criminally proscribed.  
This regulatory power exists even where the two states’ substantive laws 
conflict, meaning that state A may criminalize an activity “X” that state B 
permits.  If “causing a specified result or a purpose to cause or danger of 
                                                                                                                            
 87. This insight may have important implications with respect to the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, whose multifactored, context-sensitive doctrinal solution has been 
widely criticized as being unworkable.  See DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, 
COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 222 (6th ed. 2001).  Even if valid, the criticisms do not necessarily 
mean that the principles the Restatement has identified are wrongheaded, but instead may mean 
that courts are not the appropriate governmental institutions for making the inquiries that are 
necessary for fair resolutions of such conflicts. 
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causing such a result is an element of an offense [in state A] and the result 
occurs or is designed or likely to occur only in another jurisdiction [state B] 
where the conduct charged would not constitute an offense,” state A 
nonetheless may prosecute person Z who caused the specified result in state 
B, despite the fact that only state A, and not state B, criminalizes the act.88  
What matters for present purposes is that despite the fact that state A’s and 
state B’s laws conflict—state A proscribes activity “X” whereas state B 
permits it—there is no sorting rule to determine which state’s law applies 
and which state’s law does not apply.  Both laws apply: State B cannot 
prosecute person Z for act “X” insofar as state B permits the act, yet state A 
can prosecute Z for having violated its laws by virtue of performing act “X”. 
The Double Jeopardy Clause’s89 “dual sovereignty” doctrine is yet 
another example of a no-sorting rule, but it opens the door to even more 
overt conflicts among the multiple regulating states.  As noted above, it 
frequently is the case that two states may criminalize a given transaction or 
occurrence.90  Full faith and credit does not apply to state A’s criminal 
judgment,91 and the dual sovereignty doctrine permits state B to prosecute 
person D for the very same conduct that was the basis for state A’s 
prosecution of person D regardless of whether state A’s prosecution resulted 
in conviction or acquittal.92  The dual sovereignty doctrine thus stands in 
stark contrast to the civil context, where overlapping state adjudicatory 
jurisdiction has given rise to time-based sorting rules that guard against 
inconsistent judgments.  The dual sovereignty doctrine is yet another Type 
4 rule. 
As with the other conflict-sorting rules, it is useful to inquire as to why 
this particular rule is found in this particular context.  The answer is not 
constitutional text; though the dual sovereignty doctrine is not inconsistent 
with the Double Jeopardy Clause’s instruction that no person shall be 
                                                                                                                            
 88. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(2) (1985). 
 89. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 90. For a discussion of the constitutional criteria that determine the maximal scope of 
states’ regulatory jurisdiction, see Rosen, supra note 12, at 871–91.  For an example of two states 
permissibly asserting their overlapping criminal jurisdiction, see Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 
(1985). 
 91. See Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970). 
 92. See Heath, 474 U.S. at 88 (1985).  The Heath case involved a situation in which the 
defendant had been convicted in the first state’s prosecution, but its rationale leads to the 
conclusion that the second state may prosecute regardless of the first case’s outcome.  See generally 
Rosen, supra note 12, at 951–52.  This, indeed, is how the doctrine operates.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Sewell, 252 F.3d 647, 651 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the federal government may 
prosecute following a previous state court acquittal for the same offense). 
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“subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,”93 it 
cannot be said to be required by the constitutional text either.  Instead, as is 
true of most conflict-sorting rules, the Supreme Court’s selection of this 
Type 4 rule was fueled by institution-sensitive, contextual analysis.  A no-
sorting rule was appropriate in respect of states’ criminal jurisdiction 
because, the Court explained, crime is “an offense against the sovereignty of 
the government” and “[w]hen a defendant in a single act violates the peace 
and dignity of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has 
committed two distinct offences.”94  Consequently, “successive prosecutions 
by two States for the same conduct are not barred by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.”95  In short, the Court justified its Type 4 conflict-sorting rule by 
means of a context-sensitive consideration of the nature of our country’s 
system of horizontal federalism, not via abstract, transsubstantive 
considerations of the acceptability or impossibility of there being 
conflicting judgments by multiple governmental institutions as to the 
permissibility of a person’s activity. 
The existence of even one no-sorting rule in contemporary law is 
strong evidence of the conceptual plausibility of Type 4 rules.  Additional 
proof, should any be needed, comes from the so-called departmentalist 
scholars who argue that the president, Congress, and federal courts each 
have an obligation to perform their duties on the basis of their own 
interpretation of the Constitution.96  On this view, the three branches of 
the federal government have overlapping authority to interpret the 
Constitution.  What is to be done if their interpretations are 
disharmonious?  Departmentalists argue that each branch has the duty to 
act in accordance with its own understanding of what the Constitution 
means.  For example, though Congress might enact a statute on the view 
that it falls within its constitutional power, departmentalists argue that the 
president must refuse to enforce the statute if he believes it to be 
unconstitutional.97  Similarly, though Congress might pass a criminal statute 
believing it to be constitutional and a federal court may convict a person 
pursuant to the statute on the belief that the statute is constitutional, the 
president may issue a pardon on the belief that the law is unconstitutional.98  
Departmentalists accordingly have adopted a Type 4 no-sorting rule insofar 
                                                                                                                            
 93. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 94. Heath, 474 U.S. at 88 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See supra note 54. 
 97. Lawson & Moore, supra note 54, at 1303. 
 98. Id. at 1302–03. 
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as there is no effort to select which of the conflicting understandings is to 
govern.  Rather, all interpretations govern, each in its respective sphere.99 
C. Others? 
To quickly conclude, governmental power to do “X” frequently rests 
with more than one governmental institutional within our country.  The 
existence of overlapping governmental authority creates the possibility of 
conflict among the various governmental institutions.  The CCS 
assumption is one sort of conflict-sorting principle—a rule that resolves 
conflicts by establishing a categorical hierarchy among institutions.  
Subpart B established that there are other types of conflict-sorting 
principles that are present in contemporary law.  There is no reason to 
believe that the four types of conflict-sorting principles identified in 
Subpart B exhaust the possibilities.  Context-sensitive analysis that is 
tailored to institutional particulars has given rise to the conflict-sorting 
rules that have been created to date, and there is no basis for concluding 
that the process of doctrinal evolution has come to an end. 
                                                                                                                            
 99. Consider as well the controversy concerning President Washington’s issuance of the 
Neutrality Proclamation of 1793.  The question confronting Washington was whether the 1778 
treaty of alliance between France and the United States required the United States to enter the 
war that France had declared on Great Britain and Holland in 1793.  Although the Constitution 
grants Congress the power to declare war, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11, Washington 
concluded that he had power under the Constitution to interpret the United States’ treaty with 
France and proclaimed that it did not obligate the United States to join France’s war with Great 
Britain.  Alexander Hamilton’s defense of President Washington’s power to issue the Neutrality 
Proclamation rested on the understanding that the president’s and Congress’s powers overlapped 
and that each institution could act according to its best understanding of what should be done.  
Hamilton rejected the view that Congress’s power of declaring war “naturally includes the right of 
judging whether the nation is or is not under obligations to make war” and concluded instead that 
the President has the right 
to determine the condition of the nation, though it may, in its consequences, affect the 
exercise of the power of the Legislature to declare war.  Nevertheless, the executive 
cannot thereby control the exercise of that power.  The Legislature is still free to perform 
its duties, according to its own sense of them; though the executive, in the exercise of its 
constitutional powers, may establish an antecedent state of things, which ought to weigh 
in the legislative decisions.  The division of the executive power in the Constitution 
creates a concurrent authority in the cases to which it relates. 
Alexander Hamilton, Letters of Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 432, 440, 442 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904).  Hamilton’s argument, 
applying my taxonomy, both recognizes overlapping governmental authority between the 
president and Congress, and proposes a Type 4 no-sorting rule. 
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III. WHY JACKSON’S CONCURRENCE DOES NOT ADEQUATELY 
JUSTIFY THE CCS ASSUMPTION 
This Part argues that Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence should not be 
interpreted as providing the definitive solution for how conflicts between 
Congress’s power and the president’s commander-in-chief powers should be 
resolved.  Subpart A shows that the concurrence provides inadequate 
justifications for the CCS assumption.  Subpart B provides additional 
reasons for not understanding Jackson’s concurrence as giving the last word 
on the relationship between Congress and the commander-in-chief.  A 
careful reading of the concurrence reveals that Justice Jackson did not 
actually apply the rigid tripartite framework and the CCS rule when 
considering this relationship.  Instead, Justice Jackson’s discussion regarding 
the relation between Congress and the commander-in-chief was far more 
ambivalent and ambiguous than the apparent simplicity of the CCS rule 
suggests.  Indeed, for reasons made clear in Subpart B, the concurrence’s 
discussion of the relationship between Congress and the commander-in-
chief is best understood as dicta.  Subpart C then addresses the potential 
objection that this Article’s argument is irrelevant because, on the basis of 
stare decisis, the Jackson concurrence should be understood as having 
settled the relation between Congress and the commander-in-chief. 
A. Inadequate Justifications for the CCS Assumption 
Armed with the understanding from Part II that there are many 
possible conflict-sorting principles, and that many different conflict-sorting 
principles are present in our jurisprudence, we now are in a position to 
understand why Justice Jackson’s famed Youngstown concurrence does not 
adequately justify the assumption of CCS that the concurrence regularly is 
assumed to embrace. 
To see this, we first must know where in Jackson’s concurrence we 
must direct our attention to find his justification for the assumption of 
CCS.  This is not as simple a task as one might hope because, as discussed 
above, the concurrence does not explicitly identify the CCS assumption.  
The assumption nonetheless is there, and it is found where Jackson 
discusses what has become known as category three.  Says Jackson: 
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed 
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he 
can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any 
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.  Courts can 
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sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling 
the Congress from acting upon the subject.100 
The language here of “disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject” 
is admittedly opaque, but the sense that Jackson is conveying is more clearly 
expressed two pages later in his opinion: 
[The] current seizure [can be] justified only by the severe tests under 
the third grouping, where it can be supported only by any remainder 
of executive power after subtraction of such powers as Congress may 
have over the subject.  In short, we can sustain the President only by 
holding that seizure of such strike-bound industries is within his 
domain and beyond control by Congress.101 
Thus, it is in the discussion of category three that the CCS assumption 
makes its appearance: The president is free to act contrary to Congress’s 
will, the concurrence states, only if the president has independent power to 
act and Congress’s act was beyond its constitutional powers.  This means 
that where presidential and congressional powers overlap and Congress has 
spoken, the president is categorically bound to follow Congress’s instruction 
and cannot follow his own desires.  And this, of course, is precisely the 
meaning of the rule of CCS. 
1. Precedent 
Having located where the CCS assumption appears, we now are in a 
position to scrutinize the support the concurrence provides for this crucial 
principle.  Virtually none can be found.  Jackson first turns to precedent.  
He cites to only one case, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,102 which he 
explains (only in a footnote) as follows: “President Roosevelt’s effort to 
remove a Federal Trade Commissioner was found to be contrary to the 
policy of Congress and impinging upon an area of congressional control, 
and so his removal power was cut down accordingly.”103 
To begin, a case concerning the bounds of the president’s removal 
powers under the Take Care Clause hardly qualifies as solid grounding for 
determining the scope of presidential powers that flow from his other 
constitutional powers (such as, for instance, his commander-in-chief 
powers).  In other words, even if Humphrey’s Executor adopted a Type 1A 
                                                                                                                            
 100. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 101. Id. at 640 (emphasis added). 
 102. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 103. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 n.4. 
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conflict-sorting rule—that is to say, even if the case decided that 
congressional power to specify how a statute is to be administered takes 
categorical precedence over the president’s judgment as to what he must do 
to take care that the law is faithfully executed—it does not necessarily 
follow that conflicts that arise from the overlap of Congress’s powers and 
other presidential powers also would be sorted out on the basis of a Type 1A 
rule.  After all, as shown above, there is a wide array of possible conflict-
sorting rules, and the text of the Constitution has not selected any one of 
these vis-à-vis conflicts between Congress and the commander-in-chief. 
Further, a careful look at Humphrey’s Executor discloses that the case 
does not support a rule of CCS but instead was decided on the basis of very 
different legal principles.  Rather than instructing how conflicts between 
presidential powers and congressional powers are to be sorted out, 
Humphrey’s Executor held that the power to determine on what basis 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) commissioners are to be removed fell 
solely to Congress and lay outside the president’s executive powers.  
Humphrey’s Executor reasoned that the president did not exercise “executive 
power in the constitutional sense” in respect of the FTC because the FTC 
was not an “arm or an eye of the executive” but instead functioned “in part 
quasi legislatively and in part quasi judicially.”104  The majority opinion 
embraced the then-contemporary wisdom concerning “[t]he fundamental 
necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of 
government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or 
indirect, of either of the others,” and concluded that “[t]he power of 
removal here claimed for the President” in relation to the commission is 
“wholly disconnected from the executive department” insofar as the FTC 
“was created by Congress as a means of carrying into operation legislative 
and judicial powers, and as an agency of the legislative and judicial 
departments.”105  In short, Humphrey’s Executor resolved the problem before 
it by concluding that only one governmental institution (Congress) had 
power, not by deciding that two institutions had overlapping power but that 
powers of one trumped the other.  As such, Humphrey’s Executor provides 
no precedential support whatsoever for choosing among conflict-sorting 
principles.  Humphrey’s Executor accordingly cannot be said to provide 
support for CCS. 
Moreover, regardless of the validity of Humphrey’s Executor in the days 
that Youngstown was decided, any modern reliance upon Humphrey’s 
                                                                                                                            
 104. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935). 
 105. Id. at 629–30. 
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Executor as a font for the rule of CCS would be dubious in light of the 
Court’s reconceptualization of the case in Morrison v. Olsen.106  As shown 
above, Humphrey’s Executor upheld Congress’s power to limit the 
president’s power to remove an FTC commissioner by means of highly 
formalistic reasoning that focused on whether the official whose removal 
was congressionally limited “act[ed] in part quasi legislatively and in part 
quasi judicially,” in which case limiting the president’s removal power was 
permissible, or instead was a “purely executive officer[ ],” in which case the 
president’s removal power had to be unfettered.107  As has been widely 
recognized, the majority opinion in Morrison rejected Humphrey’s Executor’s 
formalism108 and instead embraced what has been termed a more 
functionalist approach that was “designed not to define rigid categories of 
those officials who may or may not be removed at will by the President, but 
to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the President’s exercise of 
the ‘executive power’ and his constitutionally appointed duty to ‘take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed’ under Article II.”109  Morrison’s 
rejection of Humphrey’s Executor’s rigid categories and its adoption instead 
of a context-sensitive analysis that inquires whether one branch’s actions 
interfere with the other branch’s  “ability to perform [its] constitutional 
duty”110 is in tension with the rule of CCS.  CCS is more in keeping with 
old-style formalism than Morrison’s functionalism insofar as analysis under 
the CCS assumption ends once it is determined that congressional 
regulatory power reaches matter “X.”  Another tension between the CCS 
assumption and Morrison’s approach is that the former encourages analysis 
that focuses attention on only one institution whereas Morrison’s 
functionalism calls for the consideration of how the governmental action 
                                                                                                                            
 106. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 107. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628–29. 
 108. The Morrison majority opinion acknowledged that the Humphrey’s Executor Court 
“undoubtedly did rely on the terms ‘quasi-legislative’ and ‘quasi-judicial’ to distinguish the officials 
involved in Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener from those in Myers, but [took the] present 
considered view . . . that the determination of whether the Constitution allows Congress to 
impose a ‘good cause’-type restriction on the President’s power to remove an official cannot be 
made to turn on whether or not that official is classified as ‘purely executive.’”  Morrison, 487 U.S. 
at 689. 
 109. Id. at 658 (citations omitted); see also id. at 691 (“[T]he real question is whether the 
removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President’s ability to perform his 
constitutional duty, and the functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that light.”). 
 110. Id. 
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under consideration is likely to play out when analyzed from the perspective 
of all governmental institutions.111 
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the Court’s functionalist 
turn in Morrison on its own strikes a death blow to formalist approaches to 
separation of powers questions generally, or to the CCS assumption in 
particular.  After all, contemporary jurisprudence inconsistently adopts 
both formalist and functionalist approaches.112  My point here is that even 
putting aside the substantive critique leveled above as to why Humphrey’s 
Executor does not speak at all to the selection of conflict-sorting principles, 
the precedential justification that Jackson’s concurrence provides for the 
CCS assumption must be understood today as insufficient on account of the 
fact that Humphrey’s Executor’s formalist methodology no longer enjoys 
unquestioning and unqualified support. 
In short, Jackson provides virtually no precedential justification for the 
proposition that Congress categorically trumps the president where their 
powers overlap.  And the case law on which he does rely has been 
reconceptualized in a manner that undermines whatever vitality it may 
have had in respect of supporting the CCS assumption.  These observations 
do not, on their own, establish that CCS is wrong.  But they do suggest that 
the concurrence’s precedential arguments are inadequate justifications for 
CCS. 
2. Structural and Functionalist Considerations 
Jackson’s concurrence provides one additional justification for its 
assumption of CCS.  The opinion states that a “Presidential claim to a 
power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with 
caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our 
constitutional system.”113  This statement is undoubtedly correct, but the 
                                                                                                                            
 111. It may seem curious that the CCS assumption should come from the pen of Justice 
Jackson, who ordinarily is associated with the move toward functionalism in separation of powers 
jurisprudence.  I discuss this point later in this Article.  The short of it is this: Though the 
tripartite framework, taken out of context, appears to incorporate an assumption of CCS, the 
Jackson concurrence did not apply the framework in a formalistic manner, but instead applied it 
in a way that is relatively consistent with functionalism.  See infra Part III.B. 
 112. See Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-
Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 613 
n.223 (2006) (noting the court’s methodological “eclecticism” in utilizing both formalist and 
functionalist approaches).  Compare Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (utilizing formalist 
approach), with Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (using functionalist approach). 
 113. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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question for present purposes is whether it is sufficient to justify the 
absolutist rule of CCS that the concurrence propounds.  That is to say, 
although the concerns Jackson mentions are very real, there are ways apart 
from a categorical rule to address them.114  After all, virtually all 
constitutional principles are operationalized by noncategorical legal tests.115  
Even where the Constitution’s language is readily construed as imposing a 
categorical proscription—consider, for example, the First Amendment’s 
declaration that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech”—it is well established (and almost universally accepted as well) 
that government may regulate (for example, by proscribing a broad range of 
speech).116  What is true for the constitutional principle of free speech—
what unquestionably is among contemporary American constitutionalism’s 
most protected principles—is true for every other constitutional right.117  
And American constitutional law’s widespread rejection of categorical rules 
extends to structural constitutional principles as well.  The “equilibrium 
established by our constitutional system”118 is threatened in all situations 
that implicate separation of powers or federal concerns, and yet the Court 
virtually always eschews the adoption of categorical rules. 
A question readily arises: Why are constitutional principles 
frequently—indeed, typically—protected by means of noncategorical legal 
tests?  The answer is that noncategoricalism responds to the complexity of 
social life.  To begin, noncategoricalism is virtually a foregone conclusion in 
a political culture that champions more than one constitutional principle.  
This is so because the existence of multiple constitutional principles 
introduces the possibility that the principles will conflict with one 
                                                                                                                            
 114. Cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2182–83 (1998) (making a similar critique of the Printz v. United States 
case’s adoption of a categorical constitutional rule); see also Mark D. Rosen, Modeling 
Constitutional Doctrine, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691, 703–04 (2005). 
 115. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001). 
 116. In addition to the federal statutes that criminalize the speech that is called extortion 
and espionage, and that civilly sanction speech that antitrust jurisprudence deems troublesome, 
the Supreme Court has upheld state laws that proscribe content-based, purely political speech, see 
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), as well as a federal law that banned 
“intemperate . . . disloyal, contemptuous, and disrespectful” speech, see Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 
733, 739, 758–61 (1974). 
 117. So, for example, though the Constitution declares that “[n]o state shall” enact a “Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts,” see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, the Court long ago upheld a 
state law that prevented mortgagees from foreclosing on defaulting mortgagors pursuant to lawful 
provisions of lawful mortgage contracts; see Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 
(1934). 
 118. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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another,119 and the right that ultimately is subordinated cannot readily be 
understood to be categorical. 
This turns out to be only a small part of the story behind 
noncategoricalism, however, for the practice of noncategoricalism in the 
United States is far more extensive than the above account suggests.  Most 
of the time, American constitutional rights are held to be noncategorical 
not on account of the existence of competing constitutional rights, but due 
to competing nonconstitutional policy considerations.  This is captured in 
the canonical legal test that is utilized to operationalize America’s most 
prized constitutional rights, the so-called strict scrutiny test: Governmental 
regulation of the handful of rights that trigger strict scrutiny120 is 
constitutional so long as there is a compelling governmental interest,121 not 
a constitutional governmental interest.  Consistent with this formulation, 
virtually all governmental interests that have been upheld as compelling 
have not themselves been of constitutional moment.  Not infrequently, in 
fact, the Court has allowed fundamental constitutional interests to be 
regulated on account of governmental interests that even fall short of  
compelling.122  For example, although fetuses do not have a constitutional 
life interest, the Court has decided that states have a sufficiently important 
interest in protecting them that states may seek to dissuade pregnant 
women from exercising their constitutional abortion rights and, after a 
certain point in the pregnancy, may prohibit abortions altogether.123 
In short, U.S. constitutional law regularly permits nonconstitutional, 
governmental interests to prevail over constitutionally protected rights.  
Constitutional doctrine permits this because the law recognizes that life is 
                                                                                                                            
 119. For example, women’s equal protection right can come into conflict with men’s 
association rights, see William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 NW. U. L. 
REV. 68, 68–69 (1986), and the private property right of a shopping center owner can conflict 
with the public’s free speech rights, see, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 
(1980). 
 120. This includes speech, fundamental rights, and the Equal Protection Clause’s treatment 
of racial classifications.  See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis 
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 798–801 (2006). 
 121. In addition to this requirement, strict scrutiny also famously demands that the means 
used by government be narrowly tailored.  See id. at 800–01. 
 122. See Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 277 (2007). 
 123. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).  Such a 
prohibition is subject to there being an exception should the life or health of the mother be 
threatened, a caveat that does not affect the point made above in text.  See also Stenberg v. 
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000).  The Court’s recent decision in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 
1610 (2007), provides additional vivid evidence of the noncategorical protection that the 
abortion right affords in relation to even nonconstitutional counterveiling consideration. 
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complex.  Giving absolutist, categorical effect to constitutional principles is 
not possible insofar as constitutional principles conflict with one another.  
And even where there are no such constitutional conflicts, giving 
categorical effect frequently is undesirable on account of the severe costs 
that categoricalism would pose to important, albeit nonconstitutional, 
governmental interests (such as protecting fetal life). 
But, one might ask, is there a noncategorical option that realistically 
could serve as an alternative to CCS in the context of conflicts between 
Congress and the president’s commander-in-chief powers?  The answer is 
yes.  As catalogued above, there are four types of conflict-sorting principles 
that are found in American constitutional law that resolve conflicts 
between or among governmental institutions that have overlapping powers.  
All of these are theoretical possibilities, though the nature of the conflict in 
this context likely eliminates several of them.  But to concretely illustrate 
one plausible candidate, conflicts between the president’s commander-in-
chief powers and Congress’s power to regulate the land and naval forces 
could be analyzed using a strict but noncategorical rule under which 
presidential action pursuant to the commander-in-chief powers that was 
inconsistent with statutory requirements would be strongly presumed to be 
unconstitutional.  Drawing on well-established legal tests that 
operationalize many of our most cherished constitutional rights, the 
presumption of unconstitutionality might be rebutted only upon a showing 
of a compelling governmental interest and that the president’s actions were 
narrowly tailored.124 
There are yet other alternatives to a categorical rule that could also 
protect the “equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”  The 
point for present purposes is not to defend preferable alternatives 
(something I attempt to do elsewhere125) but to show that Jackson’s 
unquestionably correct observation—“Presidential claim to a power at once 
so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at 
                                                                                                                            
 124. As a concrete example, consider the McCain Amendment, which appears to 
categorically proscribe torture on the battlefield.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd(a).  Assume for now 
that the power to direct battlefield interrogations falls under both the president’s commander-in-
chief powers and Congress’s power to regulate the land and naval forces.  Under CCS, the 
president would be absolutely forbidden to torture.  Under a strict but noncategorical conflict-
sorting rule, the president could disregard the statute under very pressing circumstances.  I hasten 
to add that although I provide this example for the purpose of illustrating the operation of a Type 
1B conflict-sorting rule, this is not the approach I favor to resolving conflicts between Congress 
and the commander-in-chief.  I elaborate my preferred approach in a work in progress.  See Rosen, 
supra note 6. 
 125. See Rosen, supra note 114, at 703–04.  A work in progress elaborates yet another 
option.  See Rosen, supra note 6. 
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stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system”126—is not 
sufficient on its own to justify the principle of CCS. 
B. The Concurrence’s Ambiguities and Equivocations 
In this Subpart, I describe four additional reasons why Jackson’s 
concurrence should not be understood as having sufficiently justified its 
assumption of CCS in relation to conflicts between Congress and the 
commander-in-chief. 
First, there is tension within the concurrence itself as to how 
mechanical in operation the tripartite framework is intended to be.  As 
discussed above, the framework itself—and category three in particular—is 
premised on an assumption of CCS that appears to give rise to a mechanical 
method of analysis that resolves conflicts between Congress and the 
commander-in-chief by simply inquiring whether Congress has regulated 
pursuant to its enumerated powers.  If Congress has done so, then the 
president is obligated to follow Congress’s instruction.  But other parts of 
the Jackson concurrence eschew the mechanical approach that the 
framework itself suggests.  Jackson introduced the framework with the 
caveat of its being a “somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical 
situations in which a President may doubt . . . his powers.”127  Further, 
immediately before presenting his famous framework, Jackson cautioned 
that “[t]he actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and 
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches 
based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context.”128  
Rather, the Constitution “enjoins upon its branches separateness but 
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.”129  This introductory guidance 
stands in tension with analyzing the scope of the commander-in-chief’s 
powers by means of the discrete, nearly mechanical analysis that the 
framework’s category three appears to call for, and that has been advocated 
by contemporary critics of the Bush Administration.130 
Second, the concurrence did not apply the tripartite framework in the 
mechanical way that the framework, viewed in isolation, appears to require.  
Jackson spent nearly five U.S. Reports pages of his opinion explaining why 
                                                                                                                            
 126. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 127. Id. at 635. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
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the president’s commander-in-chief powers did not extend to seizing 
domestic production facilities that potentially could be paralyzed due to an 
economic struggle between labor and industry.131  This entire discussion 
would be irrelevant under a mechanical reading of Jackson’s framework.  
Because Congress unquestionably had the power to regulate labor relations 
in the steel industry and had in fact regulated (denying the president the 
power he sought to exercise), whether the Commander-in-Chief Clause 
also had application to labor relations in the steel industry would have been 
immaterial under CCS’s assumption that legislation categorically trumps 
the president’s commander-in-chief powers.132  The fact that Jackson spent 
so much time ascertaining the scope of the president’s commander-in-chief 
powers suggests that he did not actually apply the framework in the 
mechanical, single-institution focused way that CCS calls for. 
A third reason not to understand Jackson’s concurrence as establishing 
that conflicts between Congress and the commander-in-chief are to be 
resolved by the CCS rule is that the concurrence’s discussion concerning 
the relationship between the president’s commander-in-chief powers and 
Congress’s powers is dicta.  This is so because, as noted immediately above, 
Jackson ultimately concluded that Truman’s actions did not fall within the 
president’s commander-in-chief powers.133  Jackson accordingly did not have 
to decide how to sort out a conflict between the president’s commander-in-
chief powers and Congress’s powers. 
Finally, the central justification for not according dicta the weight of a 
holding—that analysis not necessary for the holding is less apt to be 
carefully thought through134—is applicable to Jackson’s concurrence.  His 
opinion makes observations about the relationship between the 
                                                                                                                            
 131. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 641–46. 
 132. I am indebted to Dean Hal Krent for this point.  To be sure, it could be responded that 
Jackson intended the entire discussion concerning the scope of the president’s commander-in-
chief powers solely to be a response to the government’s argument that President Truman’s 
actions were justified on the basis of the Commander-in-Chief Clause.  See id. at 641.  Even so, it 
is striking that Jackson did not respond to the solicitor general’s argument simply by saying—or, at 
the very least, by also saying—that, as per his framework, the president could not seize the steel 
mills because Congress has exercised the regulatory authority it has over them. 
 133. Id. at 644–45. 
 134. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400 (1821) (“It is a maxim not to 
be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the 
case in which those expressions are used.  If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but 
ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for 
decision.  The reason of this maxim is obvious.  The question actually before the Court is 
investigated with care, and considered in its full extent.  Other principles which may serve to 
illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all 
other cases is seldom completely investigated.”). 
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commander-in-chief powers and Congress’s powers that are in deep tension 
with one another.  At one point in the concurrence, Jackson stated that he 
would “indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain [the 
President’s] exclusive function to command the instruments of national 
force” pursuant to the Commander-in-Chief Clause.135  Elsewhere, however, 
Jackson maintained that Congress is “empowered to make rules for the 
‘Government and Regulation of land and naval Forces,’ by which it may to 
some unknown extent impinge upon even command functions.”136  These 
statements stand in obvious tension with one another.  Jackson was not 
required to write more carefully on this topic because, under his analysis, 
there was no conflict between Congress and the president as commander-
in-chief.  For these very reasons, the lessons concerning the limits of dicta 
are well taken with regard to the concurrence’s discussion of how conflicts 
between Congress’s and the president’s commander-in-chief powers are to 
be resolved. 
In short, though recent commentators treat the concurrence’s 
framework as having provided a definitive resolution of conflicts between 
Congress and the commander-in-chief by adopting a rule of CCS that calls 
for a mechanical inquiry that focuses on whether Congress acted pursuant 
to its delegated powers, there are good reasons to conclude that Jackson 
neither used nor intended his framework to be used in this way. 
C. Answering a Potential Objection 
To this Article’s argument that the Jackson concurrence does not 
adequately justify the rule of CCS, it might be objected that CCS is a 
settled rule on the basis of stare decisis principles.  There are two strong 
responses to any such objection. 
First, stare decisis does not demand that the concurrence be treated as 
having settled the relation between Congress and the commander-in-chief 
because, as shown immediately above, the concurrence did not understand 
itself to have resolved that question.  By intention and in actual effect, any 
discussion the concurrence provided concerning the relation between 
Congress and the commander-in-chief was mere dicta.  Granting definitive 
and final status to the CCS assumption for these reasons would be unwise, 
indeed perverse. 
                                                                                                                            
 135. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 136. Id. at 644. 
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Second, even if the concurrence viewed itself as providing a settled 
and firm answer to the question of how conflicts between Congress and the 
commander-in-chief are to be resolved, any such perception should not be 
determinative where it can be shown that the “firm” answer was arrived at 
without a full appreciation and consideration of the options from among 
which the opinion made a selection.  One of the well-established bases for 
eschewing stare decisis and overturning precedent is where the reasoning 
(or lack thereof) of the earlier decision has been deemed to be inadequate 
by the clarity afforded by the passage of time.137  The Jackson concurrence’s 
inadequate appreciation of the range of available conflict-sorting rules from 
among which a choice had to be made fatally undermines any conclusion 
that CCS is appropriately viewed as a settled constitutional principle.  This 
conclusion should not be weakened by the fact that a subsequent case—
namely, the Hamdan decision—has mistakenly viewed the rule of CCS as 
having been definitively settled by the Jackson concurrence.  The difficulty 
of amending the Court’s constitutional judgments strongly counsels against 
an approach to stare decisis that treats as definitively settled a 
constitutional question that has not received adequate consideration.  To 
be clear, though, my argument in this Article is not that CCS is wrong and 
should be overturned, but simply that it should not be viewed as a definitive 
and settled constitutional principle. 
CONCLUSION 
The CCS assumption underwrites the logic of categories two and 
three.  Yet Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence did not provide sufficiently 
robust reasons to adopt this assumption.  The justificatory inadequacies are 
particularly troubling once one recognizes that the CCS assumption is a 
conflict-sorting rule and that American law has adopted alternative 
conflict-sorting rules in other circumstances in which two or more 
governmental institutions have overlapping authority. 
A crucial question then arises: On what basis is the choice among 
conflict-sorting rules to be made?  A careful study of the other contexts of 
overlapping authority points the way to answering this crucial question.  In 
one context of overlapping governmental authority—that of federal and 
state law—constitutional text itself provides a clear answer; the Supremacy 
                                                                                                                            
 137. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (quoting from Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), and concluding “[t]hat statement, we now conclude, 
discloses the Court’s own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake” and proceeding to 
overturn the case). 
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Clause unequivocally provides a Type 1A categorical institution-trumping 
rule.  But, in virtually all other circumstances of overlapping governmental 
powers, including as between Congress and the commander-in-chief, 
constitutional text does not provide a conflict-sorting rule.  In these other 
contexts of overlapping governmental authority, a significant—indeed, 
arguably the overwhelming—basis for choosing among conflict-sorting rules 
has been an analysis of the likely consequences of adopting the conflict-
sorting rule under consideration.  Such analyses perforce have been highly 
institution sensitive, taking account of the context at hand, what is at 
stake, and the characteristics of the various institutions involved in the 
conflict. 
Consider, for example, courts’ overlapping adjudicatory jurisdiction.  
Type 2A time-based rules that give trumping power to the first court’s final 
judgment have been justified not on abstract grounds concerning the nature 
of how conflicts need be resolved, but on the institution-sensitive grounds 
that such a rule is necessary to avoid inconsistent results, secure efficiency, 
and protect parties against a series of lawsuits.138  Similarly, the one Type 2B 
time-based rule that appears in the context of overlapping adjudicatory 
jurisdiction, which gives precedence to the later judgment, has been 
selected and justified on the basis of institutional considerations,139 not on 
higher level theories of conflict resolution.  Giving effect to the first of 
several judgments, the Court has reasoned, would undercut the incentives 
that are necessary to ensure that parties invoke the defenses of merger, 
claim preclusion, and issue preclusion at the earliest possible time. 
This pattern of institution-sensitive analysis in the selection of  
conflict-sorting rules is present in other contexts of overlapping 
governmental authority.  A Type 4 no-sorting rule has been adopted in the 
context of overlapping state criminal jurisdiction on the basis of 
considerations that are specific to that institutional context; two or more 
states can criminally regulate a given transaction or occurrence because 
each may have distinct interests that may be properly vindicated in each 
state’s criminal law system.140 
Finally, consider the overlapping powers of the different branches of 
the federal government to interpret the Constitution.  The Supreme Court 
has adopted a Type 1B institution-based sorting rule that grants the 
Supreme Court final interpretive authority, but requires that the Court give 
                                                                                                                            
 138. See supra text accompanying note 75. 
 139. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 93–95. 
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deference to the constitutional judgments of the other branches of federal 
government.141  Those justifying this rule have done so largely on 
institutional grounds, and those criticizing it have done the same.  Larry 
Alexander and Fred Schauer’s defense of “judicial supremacy” (the part of 
the Type 1B conflict-sorting rule that gives courts the final say) rests 
primarily on functionalist considerations of what the consequences of its 
denial would entail;142 predictions of such consequences rest entirely on 
assessments of the characteristics of the various governmental and 
nongovernmental institutions.  Judicial deference to the interpretations of 
the other branches of the federal government has been justified on the 
institutional basis that Congress and the president are coordinate branches 
of government that are entrusted with interpreting the Constitution and 
are deserving of respect.  Similarly, the strongest criticisms of judicial 
supremacy that have been pressed by contemporary critics have been 
institutional in nature.  Jeremy Waldron’s recent article The Core of the 
Case Against Judicial Review, for instance, considers the nature of the 
reasoning that is called for by constitutional interpretation and argues that 
the nonjudicial branches of the government are well suited to playing this 
role.143 
Indeed, Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence itself gestured 
toward institution-based analysis.  As shown above, one of the opinion’s 
two fleeting justifications for category three was that “Presidential claim to 
a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with 
caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our 
constitutional system.”144  This argument points us toward considering the 
context at hand and the possible consequences of adopting a particular 
conflict-sorting rule vis-à-vis institutional dynamics.  Unfortunately, 
                                                                                                                            
 141. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980) (deferring to Congress’s 
constitutional judgment in the equal protection context); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) (deferring to Congress’s judgment in the First 
Amendment context); see also Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 61 (1989) (“To be 
sure, we owe some deference to Congress’ judgment after it has given careful consideration to the 
constitutionality of a legislative provision.”). 
 142. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 
CONST. COMMENT. 455, 457 (2000) (arguing that “a central moral function of law is to settle 
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Jackson’s opinion does not adequately follow through with this line of 
analysis.  There are many possible reasons for the concurrence’s 
incompleteness in this regard: It may be a product of the compressed time 
during which the Youngstown opinions were written, a result of the fact that 
any discussions about resolving conflicts between Congress and the 
commander-in-chief were unnecessary dicta insofar as Jackson did not 
believe that Truman’s actions fell within the commander-in-chief’s powers, 
or because Jackson did not fully appreciate the range of available conflict-
sorting options among which he had to choose.  At the end of the day, the 
precise reasons for the concurrence’s inadequacies are not terribly 
important.  What does matter is that the American legal community not 
continue to think that the relation between Congress and the commander-
in-chief was definitively resolved by Jackson’s majestic Youngstown 
concurrence.  Rather, the conflict-sorting rule of CCS that underwrites the 
tripartite framework has not yet been adequately justified despite the 
availability of several alternative conflict-sorting rules. 
